If conceiving mind were not forbidding enough, modem investigators have impeded their quests by treating mind as an epistemological foundation, determining the object of knowledge. Conflating logic and philosophical psychology, this move renders knowledge relative to privileged mental conditions. How these can be immediately transparent remains just as inexplicable as how they can be not just enabling conditions of all beliefs, but determining grounds distinguishing the true from false.
If what is knowable is relative to some psychological foundation, that foundation either is accessible directly or is itself a conditioned construct. Any direct accessibility of the psychological foundation, however, contradicts the very view that what is knowable is derivatively constructed from some structure of mind.
Conversely, relegating the psychological foundation to a conditioned construct con- tradicts its privileged role as the alleged foundation of knowledge. The dilemma of confusing epistemology with the theory of mind has been compounded by the equating of mind and consciousness. This identification traps all knowing in the opposition of consciousness, where cognition confronts its object as an independent given providing the standard of truth for knowledge.
Correspondence can then never be confirmed since consciousness must always access its objects through its own "representations", instead of directly as they are in themselves. Owing to consciousness' own constitutive opposition, whenever con- sciousness attempts to certify whether its knowledge conforms to its object, consciousness discovers that the "object" with which it compares its belief is the object as consciousness represents it to itself. Consciousness' putative knowledge is thus left without certification. Consequently, if the standpoint of consciousness is taken to be insurmountable, neither that very assertion nor any other can be successfully validated.
Beyond conflating mind and consciousness, many contemporary thinkers have further gone astray by considering all consciousness to be conceptually discursive, precluding any pre-linguistic conscious awareness. Following Kant, they have treated consciousness as inherently discursive, as if awareness of objectivity depended upon conceptual regularities rooted in linguistic intelligence.
This makes unfathomable how language and thought can be acquired. If individuals could not even be conscious or self-consciousness without already enjoying discursive rationality, they would be unable to distinguish themselves from other minds and other things and learn how the expressions of themselves and others can communicate anything about the world they observe in common. However prevalent all these quandaries, they become surmountable with the help of thinking through the neglected arguments of the great philosophical maverick who refuses to give philosophical psychology epistemological significance, to banish subjectivity from objectivity, to conflate mind and consciousness, to treat all consciousness as discursive, and to ignore accounting for the psychological conditions of philosoph- ical reason.
That maverick is Hegel and his pioneering contributions to the philosophy of mind are ready to be mined once attention turns to the analyses where he systematically conceives the different spheres of mental life. These analyses are preeminently located in Hegel's investiga- tion of "Subjective Spirit" in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, an investigation ignored almost as much in the vast literature on Hegel as in contemporary philosophy of mind.
Attention has instead focused upon Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel does not give a positive account of mind, but instead provides an internal, immanent critique of the misguided approach of modern epistemology, which takes the opposition of consciousness as definitive of knowing. By ignoring both this outcome and the positive theory of mind developed by Hegel in his Encyclopedia Philosophy of Subjective Spirit, thinkers have tended to embrace the conflation of mind and consciousness, losing sight of the radical solutions Hegel provides for the dilemmas plaguing modern philosophy of mind.
The following work attempts to plumb the riches to be found in Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and rethink some of the most fundamental problems of philosophical psychology. Chapter 1 introduces Hegel's thoroughgoing challenge to the phi- losophy of mind, investigating how Hegel's basic division of mind into spheres of a preconscious psyche, a pre-linguistic consciousness, and intelligence provide a framework for resolving the most daunting problems of philosophical psychology.
Chapter 2 thereupon examines how Hegel's conception of mind over- comes both mind-body dualisms and the dilemmas of the problematic remedies proposed by Spinoza, materialist reductionists, Aristotle, and Searle. Chapter 3 attempts to clarify the distinctive character of mental real- ity by drawing upon Hegel's logical analyses of mechanism, chemism, life, and teleology in conjunction with his analyses of the psyche, con- sciousness, and intelligence. Arguments contained in these discussions are enlisted to illuminate why mind cannot be reduced to any mecha- nism and why machines can never feel, be conscious, or think.
Chapter 4 then proceeds to draw upon Hegel's analysis of recognition to show how self-consciousness depends upon not only consciousness of spatial objects and the self's body, but deSire and intersubjective relationships. These interactions comprise a pre-linguistic recognition process constituting a nondiscursive self-consciousness without which linguistic intelligence is impossible. Chapter 5 leaves the psyche and consciousness behind to focus on intelligence so as to uncover the psychological realization of reason.
Thinking through Hegel's account of how representation paves the way for thought, this investigation clarifies why thinking involves intel- ligence rather than just conSciousness, why conceptualization involves a universality beyond the bounds of representation, and how semiotic imagination enables intelligence to enter the realm of thought, liberated from the opposition of consciousness. The philosophy of mind thereby accounts for the psychological conditions of its own theorizing.
Introduction xiii. Chapter 6 turns from theoretical to practical intelligence to explore the psychology of will. The examination of Hegel's treatment uncovers why will involves intelligence rather than merely psyche and conscious- ness. It further explores how the successive stages in the will's psycho- logical development provide the conditions making possible normative conduct. In this way, the conception of practical intelligence brings the philosophy of mind to closure by arriving at the threshold of ethics.
Chapter 7 makes explicit the epistemological ramifications of the preceding investigations of the different spheres of mind. Contrasting Davidson with Hegel, the discussion examines why neither conscious- ness nor the intersubjectivity of linguistic intelligence can serve as epis- temological foundations. Although the different spheres of mind may comprise enabling conditions of knowledge, they cannot serve as deter- mining conditions distinguishing the true and false beliefs they equally make possible. As Hegel shows, the intersubjectivity of linguistic intel- ligence does not render reason socially relative.
The truth of discourse instead rests upon the intrinsic connection between the autonomy of conceptual determination and the independence of objectivity. The modern controversy in the philosophy of mind Much debate in modern philosophy of mind has revolved around whether awareness of self, awareness of objects, and awareness of others are intrinsically connected.
Controversy has raged ever since Descartes examined what could be doubted, found certainty only of "I" as a thinking thing, and then presumed that self-consciousness could be had without consciousness of anything else. Kant contested this solipsism by showing that self-consciousness could not be apart from conscious- ness of objects in space. Insofar as intuition of time requires awareness of a persisting backdrop that only spatial objectivity provides, the tem- porality of self-awareness is inseparable from consciousness of nature in space.
Kant's transcendental idealism, however, leaves objectivity merely an appearance, relative to consciousness. As a law-governed realm appearing to consciousness in general, phenomena do retain a comparatively nonsubjective character consisting in an intersubjective commonality extending to all conscious selves. Yet this law-governed character of appearance excludes any experience of spontaneity.
Given that spontaneity is basic to selfhood, this exclusion renders problematic consciousness of other selves, just as much as self-consciousness. Hence, on his own terms, Kant cannot make any legitimate theoretical claims about intersubjectivity. Moreover, since no distinction can be drawn between what is general and individual if no plurality is knowable, Kant can hardly claim any knowledge about consciousness in general. These difficulties might seem to be resolved by the reconception of mind following in the wake of Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Davidson.
On this view, self-knowledge, knowledge of objects, and knowledge of others are inseparably connected. By invoking jus- tification and the appeal to reasons, knowledge involves propositions and the concepts they contain. This is true of self-knowledge as much as of knowledge of other objects, including other selves. Concepts and the propositions they inhabit pre-suppose language. Because language is not private, the acquisition of the concepts making knowledge possible is bound up with the intersubjective process of learning and using a language.
To the extent that words are learned by observing how others employ them in reference to commonly perceived objects, there can be no knowledge that does not rest upon the conjuncture of self-knowledge, knowledge of objects, and knowledge of other speakers. Accordingly, one cannot coherently entertain Cartesian doubt and be certain of one's own existence while being uncertain of everything else, nor can one be self-conscious and conscious of objects in space without knowing other interlocutors.
By itself, the connection between knowledge, propositions, and lan- guage need not bear upon the validity of the knowledge claims made possible by linguistic interaction. The connection can simply mean that any certainty of self cannot be coherently detached from certainty of some objects other than the self, and from certainty of other selves.
The followers of Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Davidson, however, accord epistemological significance to the inseparability of self-knowledge, knowledge of objects, and knowledge of others. So treating linguistic conditions of meaning as conditions of truth presents problems. Because communication is contingent upon what interlocutors happen to rec- ognize in common as the objective reference of commonly employed expressions, making this interaction determinative of not just what terms mean, but whether they provide knowledge, renders knowledge relative to contingent linguistic interaction.
Given how meanings are interconnected in the ever-changing web of language, what results is a relativist holism, wherein no concepts or principles have any necessity and where knowledge claims are justified with conventional standards as contingent and variable as the rules of any game. Paradoxically, if this were true, the theory affirming the interconnection of knowledge, concepts, and language, would be relative to linguistic convention, leaving it and every other knowledge claim suspect and corrigible.
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The holistic interconnection of meanings cannot redeem their truth by some principle of charity, for that idea is equally contingent upon shared practices neither infallible nor unwavering. Compounding this problem is the accompanying presumption that discursive knowledge and consciousness are inseparable. Their connec- tion is implied by the assumption that consciousness is a knowledge of objects and that therefore subjects cannot be conscious without dispos- ing of concepts and propositions and the linguistic engagement that these involve.
This view is anticipated by Kant, who makes the objectivity of experience depend upon conceptual determination of intuitions through necessary judgments. Allegedly, because the given content and association of representations may just be subjective, they cannot con- vey anything objective unless intuitions are necessarily conceptually ordered.
Although Kant does not take account of the intersubjective implications of the discursive character of conceptual determination and objective awareness, he hereby paves the way for the linguistic turn. Needless to say, if consciousness of objects depends upon concepts and propositions and linguistic interaction, the same will be true of self- consciousness.
Then neither dumb animals nor children who have yet to acquire language can be either conscious or self-conscious. These exclusions might seem benign.
If, however, one considers the scenario where individuals acquire knowledge of self, objects, and other selves by becoming conscious, self-consciOUS, and discursive at one blow, one must wonder how selves lacking consciousness, let alone self-conSciousness, can first perform the triangulation establishing meanings. How can individuals discriminate themselves from com- monly given objects, let alone, discriminate their responses from those of others, unless some form of consciousness and self-consciousness is already available?
The unheralded challenge of Hegel's theory of mind Hegel's theory of mind is crucial for resolving these difficulties. This has been largely unrecognized due to two circumstances. On the one hand, Hegel's theory has been co-opted by Wilfrid Sellars and such epigones as Robert Brandom, who have presumed that it anticipates the linguistic holism they advance. Meanwhile, the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit in the Encyclopedia, where Hegel offers his proper philosophy of mind, has hardly been investigated. Symptomatic of this neglect is Charles Taylor's mammoth tome, Hegel, which allocates not a single page to the doctrine of subjective spirit.
To begin with, Hegel does not treat mind as an epistemological foun- dation, which determines the truth of knowledge and thereby must be known before anything else. Instead, Hegel predicates the systematic theory of mind upon the successive investigations of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Science of Logic, and the Philosophy of Nature. Before mind can be addressed, the Phenomenology of Spirit must provide access to systematic philosophy by eliminating as principle of knowing the oppo- sition of consciousness and its appeal to the given.
Finally, the Philosophy of Nature must unfold the idea of physical reality, which any other realities contain. That the investigation of mind presupposes all these inquiries has decisive ramifications. First, although the account of mind must end up conceiving how real minds can think the truth, in doing so, that account will not fall into the foundationalist trap of treating mind as a juridical epistemological principle, mandating what knowledge is valid.
The Phenomenology of Spirit has unmasked the internal untenability of the whole enterprise of treating knowing as having foundations, as having something given as its standard of truth. For its part, the Science of Logic has effected the positive deed of showing how categories are determinable without appeal to any givens.
If these efforts be taken seriously, it is too late for philosophical psychology to retain any epis- temological ambitions. Instead, the conception of mind will explain how real individuals can think, leaving undetermined which thoughts are true among those that are thinkable. The philosophy of mind can then escape invoking epistemological foundations and having to know before knowing, which would be unavoidable if true knowledge could only be ascertained by first knowing mind and its foundational role.
Instead of making conceptual determination hostage to arbitrary language games, undercutting all universal claims about thought and language, the philosophy of mind can take advantage of an independent determination of categories whose freedom from foun- dations signifies a liberation from corrigible convention. Instead of setting nature and mind apart as self-contained substances whose relationship becomes inexplicable, Hegel's placement of mind as the outcome of nature leaves mind inherently connected to a physical world in which there is life.
Moreover, because results of immanent development contain what they presuppose, Hegel here presents mind not just as a result of the animal organism, but as incorporating that organism as a constitutive element of mental life.source site
Hegel's Science of Logic
On this basis, mind is necessarily a living entity, not merely in the world, but metabolically interacting with it. Whatever theoretical challenges this point of departure may involve, it precludes the dualist problems of connecting a disembodied mind with nature or bridging an opposition of freedom and determinism.
By being in part an animal in the world, mind never faces the dilemma of dealing with an ontologically incommensurate domain. In acting, for example, mind never wields an immaterial agency exerting external causation upon the body. Instead, action is the self-activity of a being that always involves animal physiology.
Whereas most modern treatments tend to identify mind with consciousness, Hegel conceives mental reality involving three successively determined processes: the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence, all of which involve life, but are not reducible to it. These mental realms do not comprise three parts or powers of mind, given independently of one another. If that were the case, mind would be rendered a thing, whose unity would be problematic.
Instead, psyche, consciousness, and intelligence are successive stages in the self-constitution of the total- ity of mind. Given this order of development, intelligence involves consciousness and psyche, consciousness involves psyche, and psyche comprises the minimal mental process without which no others can function. Accordingly, it is possible for an animal organism to have a psyche without possessing consciousness or intelligence.
Similarly, an individual with a psyche may also possess consciousness without having intelligence. Once more, this can be due to congenital limitations related to species being or impaired prenatal development, immaturity, or loss of intel- ligence due to some harm. These options in the possible configuration of mind raise important issues regarding the psyche, consciousness, and intelligence. First, if the psyche can be had without consciousness and intelligence, but not conversely, it must be possible to identify a mental process that is not conscious or intelligent, yet provides some mental activity that consciousness as well as intelligence cannot do without.
Further, to the degree that the psyche supervenes upon the most developed form of life, animal existence, there must be some way of distinguishing between the pre-conscious activity of the psyche, and the sensibility and irritability differentiating animals from plants. Unlike Aristotle, for whom the psyche is the principle of life, possessed by plants as well as animals in its minimal form of nutritive process, Hegel here presents the psyche as something that only certain animals will possess, without necessarily having consciousness.
Two important consequences follow from the psyche subsum- ing animal life and making possible consciousness and intelligence: machines are precluded from being conscious or genuinely intelligent and any mind, finite or infinite, involving no animal body is rendered suspect. Consequences no less crucial, especially for the connection of consciousness, self-consciousness, and language, follow from Hegel's determination of consciousness prior to intelligence. To begin with, the very distinction between these two spheres per- mits what any conflation of mind with consciousness prohibits: that intelligence can transcend the opposition of consciousness, whose constitutive reference to the given fatally compromises any attempt to transform certainty into knowledge.
In this respect, Hegel's differentiation of consciousness and intelligence provides the psychological enabling conditions for systematic philosophy, which, as foundation-free, has no juridical determining conditions. This allows consciousness and self-consciousness to be possessed by both dumb animals and children who have yet to speak and think.
It also makes it possible for individuals to be con- scious of one another and of common objects without yet entering into linguistic interaction, something which may be a precondition of the triangulation in which meaning and thought become baptized. To the extent that knowledge is both conceptual and propositional, the pre-linguistic and pre-conceptual character of consciousness suggests that conscious awareness may not involve knowledge proper, but only certainty.
If the order of development is taken seriously, every shape of consciousness determined prior to the emergence of intelligence must be understood to function without discourse. This poses significant challenges. Although sense-certainty may readily be impervious to propositional knowledge, the two further stages of consciousness delineated by Hegel-perception and understanding-might seem to involve awareness of concepts and principles, both to perceive things and their properties and to understand the forces and laws in the dynamic relations of objects.
This problem appears just as acute in self-consciousness, where, strictly speaking, not only desire but also recognition should not yet involve discourse. If these forms of self- consciousness can be pre-linguistic, they too can be accessible to certain dumb animals and immature children. The same applicability applies to the reason of universal self-consciousness. If its consciousness of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity need not involve language and thinking, then conscious reason is of broader scope than commonly supposed. Yet can consciousness lay claim to any reason, not to mention understanding, without already containing an awareness of concepts and the words that allow them to be expressed?
This question can be broadened if one takes seriously Hegel's develop- ment of intelligence. Although intelligence is that mental process within which words and thoughts arise, Hegel characterizes it more generally as an awareness of reason, where mind relates itself to its own cogni- zance of what is equally subjective and objective. This allows for intelligence to have its own pre-linguistic region, which means that those individuals who participate in the engendering of language can already have some intelligence as well as consciousness. However crucial this may be to the production of signs and engagement in real speech and thinking, it presents a formidable challenge to the conception of consciousness.
To take seriously Hegel's development of stages of intelligence, one must consider how consciousness can sense, perceive, and understand without already engaging in intuition and representation. A further quandary concerns the role of intersubjectivity. Although the naturally determined life of the psyche bears the imprint of sexuality and the interrelations it implies, the absence of subject-object distinc- tions precludes intersubjectivity proper from otherwise figuring in the psychiC field of feeling.
Hegel brings intersubjectivity into consciousness in the recognition process constitutive of the type of self-consciousness from which universal self-consciousness arises. Nevertheless when Hegel develops intelligence, he refrains from explicitly involving intersubjec- tivity. This is most strikingly the case in his development of intelligence's sign-making activity and verbal memory. These moves, so crucial for the emergence of thinking, are presented without reference to any inter- subjectivity, let alone the triangulation in which individuals fix the meaning of signs through their commonly observed reactions to com- monly perceived objects.
All these questions caU for resolution, not just to test the coherence of Hegel's account of mind, but to sort out how mind achieves identity in difference, integrating psyche, consciousness, and intelligence. The psyche as the presupposition of consciousness The first issue in Hegel's account that must be addressed is how the psyche can involve more than animal physiology, yet be a pre-conscious mental process on which consciousness and intelligence depend.
What can it be that the psyche adds to the animal organism that does not already include the subject-object distinction constitutive of consciousness? For Hegel, this question is equivalent to asking for the minimal deter- minacy of mind and the answer is starkly simple. Mind without further qualification immediately supervenes upon nature in its most complete development as the animal organism and, as such, mind is the encom- passing unity that contains that reality as its constituent. This means that mind minimally has a nature of its own that is not the product of any mental process and that mind relates to it without any intermediary, incorporating it without yet modifying its content.
Hegel's Challenge to tile PlliiosopllY of Mind 9. Already, animal physiology involves its own self-monitoring organ in the form of the nervous system, regulating both sensibility and irri- tability. Supervening upon this naturally given self-registering unity, mind as psyche adds a new level of self-relation.
Unlike consciousness, however, the psyche does not relate to its content as something from which it is disengaged and confronts as an other, an objectivity with a unity of its own. Nor is the psyche self-conscious, relating to itself as self-opposing an objectivity from which it is extricated.
Instead, the psyche registers the neurophysiological totality of the animal organism as its own given being, doing so immediately. The psyche's self-relation immediately registers the animal organism it encompasses since any mediated registration would presuppose an immediate relation to the mediating factor, reinstalling an immediate self-relation as the minimal form of the life of the psyche.
As immediate, the psyche's registrations are singular and contingent, devoid of the further interceding organization that could impart universality and necessity. Although what is regis- tered reflects the organic unity of animal physiology in its interaction with the surrounding biosphere, the immediacy of mind's relation to its natural constituent takes all this in without any discrimination.
The psyche simply feels and what it feels is itself as immediately given. For this reason, Hegel observes, the psyche is subject to an anthropological treatment, where the psyche draws its content from natural processes that are not yet products of its own mental activity. In so doing, the psyche does not sense something it confronts from a disengaged standpoint, straddling a subject-object divide.
The psyche relates to its own nature in feeling.
In contrast to the "I" of consciousness, which senses an object with an independent unity, the self of the psyche is what it feels and feels what it is. In feeling, the psyche is related to itself without relating to anything other and, for just this reason, the psyche is self-feeling without being conscious or self-conscious. Accordingly, the psyche can undergo naturally alternating phases of sleep and awakening, without waking necessarily being accompanied by consciousness, self-consciousness, or intelligence.
Although the awake psyche distinguishes itself from being asleep, what are opposed are two naturally occurring phases of itself, not subject versus object. Thus, before developing subject-object awareness, infants and young children can be awake and self-feeling, just as animals to which consciousness need never be ascribed. These distinctions indicate how the psyche can be a mental domain independent of consciousness and intelligence, but more is needed to establish the dependence of conscious awareness upon the psyche.
Hegel's account of the psyche's development from self-feeling through habit to emotive expression offers a neglected key. In order for mind to be conscious, two requirements must be met. Mind must relate to its own determinations as being both for it and as determinations of an object.
If mind's own determinations are not for it, mind lacks the self-relation on which depends the givenness to consciousness of any object. Unless mind's determinations fall within its own field of awareness, mind can hardly have any object before it. On the other hand, mind must treat its own determinations as being of something other to it, possessing an independent unity from which mind has extricated itself.
Otherwise, mind only communes with itself and there is no subject-object relation. For mind to be conscious without the need of any pre-conscious mental life, these two requirements would have to be immediately satisfied, as the minimal shape of mind. Yet how can what is immediately given to mind have an independent unity without some mediation of its manifold content? And how can mind extricate itself from this mani- fold without first being in immediate relation to it and then separating itself from it? These questions go together, for the extrication of mind from its own mental determinacy is only possible if that determinacy can acquire an independent unity, leaving mind an abstracted subject, disengaged from the given material of its feelings.
The psyche, immediately registering the given neurophysiology of its animal organism, need not presuppose any other mentality since self-feeling is an unmediated communing with an immediately given manifold yet unmodified by any further mental activity. The problem that must be resolved to account for consciousness is how the psyche can develop out of its passive receptivity, separate its self-related unity from its own mental content, and enable that content to stand for it as an independently unified opposing objectivity. Since this must be achieved by the psyche without appeal to other mental processes that take it for granted, the genesis of consciousness can no more involve discursive aspects of intelligence than involve sensation, perception, understanding, desire, recognition, or any other form of subject-object relations.
Hegel's account of habit provides the first crucial step in solving the problem. What is felt is immediately given and that it be felt by the self-same psyche does not add anything to the felt content beyond what the neuro-physiology of the animal organism already provides, given its individual realization of its species being and its unique trajectory through its biosphere. Admittedly, by feeling, the psyche does mediate its mental content in that its feelings exist only insofar as the psyche feels them.
Mere feeling, however, does not of itself affect the content felt or the psyche's relation to it. The mediation of feeling by the feeling psyche is as yet wholly formal. How can the psyche overcome its own passivity and modify the content of feeling and the way it feels? Because the psyche lacks any activity other than feeling, it has no resources for modifying itself through its own activity. All it does is feel and every feeling is equally undiscriminating, immediately registering a manifold whose further organization cannot be taken in without more developed mental opera- tions.
Consequently, if any modification is to occur, it must both be a result of nothing but given feeling and happen by nature, that is, without any further contribution by mind, which, as a merely feeling psyche, has none to offer. Habit, as Hegel here delineates it, comprises just such a development, where, by nature, the occurrence of feeling alters the character of further feeling. The alteration in question cannot consist in any qualitative dif- ference in the content of feelings, for each feeling is just as singular and contingent as any other.
Nor is there any manner in which the content of one feeling can exhibit the prior occurrence of another feeling. Because feeling as such is immediate, one cannot feel relations between feelings nor the mediation of feeling by anything else. Consequently, the only way feeling can be altered by antecedently given feeling is in respect to not content, but form. Yet because feeling is immediate in form as much as in content, how mind feels can be qualitatively discriminated no more than what mind feels. All the psyche can do in relation to its feeling without qualitative discrimination is to become indifferent to its content in virtue of past feel- ing.
Becoming indifferent, that is to say, becoming habituated, involves a detachment from the content without producing a specific content alteration. Such content alteration would require a qualitative differen- tiation demanding more mediation than the psyche has at its disposal. By contrast, acclimatization to a feeling simply leaves its given content be.
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